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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
PRESIDENCY 
Yel'tsin suggests successor, Yastrzhembsky takes it back 
During his recent trip to Birmingham, England for the G-8 summit, President 
Yel'tsin reportedly introduced Dmitri Ayatskov, governor of Saratov, to President 
Clinton as "the future President of Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 19 May 98; NEXIS) 
Ayatskov later insisted that Yel'tsin was just joking, as did presidential 
spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who suggested that one should take 
Yel'tsin's statement "with a fair measure of ... healthy humor." (Ekho Moskvy, 18 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-139) Yastrzhembsky was questioned on the possibility of 
a third Yel'tsin presidency and, in particular, why the text of the president's 
comments on the subject during his Internet chat appear in the English-language 
version, but not the Russian. Explaining the omission in the Russian text as "a 
technical slip-up," Yastrzhembsky claimed that since Yel'tsin himself did not rule 
out a run at a third term, he would not rule it out either. 
 
Borodin dismissal reversed 
According to initial press reports, Kremlin business manager Pavel Borodin  
met with Chief of Staff Yumashev the evening after President Yel'tsin left for 
Birmingham. Yumashev showed Borodin presidential instructions on the splitting 
up of the Business Administration into separate departments corresponding to its 
work with the Kremlin, government and legislature. (Komsomol'skaya pravda, 19 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-139) The dismantling of the administration would 
represent a significant diminution of Borodin's authority, and therefore a strong 
hint of presidential disapproval. Borodin took the hint and announced on 18 May 
that he was leaving his position. Confirming the reports of Borodin's exit from the 
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administration, presidential spokesman Yastrzhembsky stated "it has already 
been decided that Pavel Pavlovich [Borodin] will be transferred to another job." 
(Ekho Moskvy, 18 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-139) 
 
It quickly became apparent, however, that someone forgot to inform the president 
of this decision. According to the Moscow Times, Yel'tsin learned of the move 
against Borodin during a phone conversation from Birmingham. Enraged at the 
attack on his close associate in his absence, Yel'tsin demanded that Borodin be 
reinstated. (Moscow Times, 21 May 98; NEXIS) Asked to comment on the 
reversal, Borodin said "Let Yastrzhembsky comment. He fired me, so he can 
explain." As for Yastrzhembsky, he suggested that the earlier statements on 
Borodin's departure be taken with "a healthy sense of humor." 
 
Substantial personnel changes lack clear intent 
We have come to expect periodic shake-ups in the Yel'tsin Kremlin. Normally, the 
dismissal and replacement of even just one or two officials are accompanied by 
detailed presidential decrees on reorganization, corruption allegations, insider 
gossip, or at least great fanfares of praise for the outgoing personnel. In the past 
few weeks, however, there has been a significant turnover in the Kremlin staff yet 
little public commentary. 
 
Here, then, is a list of winners and losers in the current reshuffle, in which we'll 
attempt to discern a pattern: 
 
Vladimir Putin, former advisor to St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoli Sobchak and 
former KGB intelligence officer, has been named first deputy chief of staff and 
replaces Viktoriya Mitina in supervising regional relations; 
 
Igor Shabdurasulov has been named a deputy chief of staff, tasked with 
overseeing public relations, the media and the team of speech writers; 
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Dennis Molchanov will head the Kremlin's Public Relations Department; 
 
Mikhail Komissar retains his post as deputy chief of staff for relations with the 
Duma, political parties and local administrations; and 
 
Anatoli Korabelshchikov and Mikhail Krasnov have been dismissed as 
presidential aides. 
 
More controversial appointments include the addition of more security services 
"muscle" to the apparat: 
 
Lt. Gen. Nikolai Patrushev, former deputy department head and chief of the 
Organizational Directorate of the Department for Organizational Personnel Work 
of the Foreign Security Service, was appointed director of the Main Control 
Department; and 
 
Gen. Viktor Zorin, former deputy chief of the Foreign Security Service, replaces 
Vasili Frolov as head of the president's Main Administration for Special 
Programs. 
 
Additionally, Yel'tsin has created a State Commission on Military Development to 
draft presidential decisions on military policy. The commission will be chaired by 
Prime Minister Kirienko and brings together top officials from the Ministry of 
Defense, General Staff, Border Guards, Security Council, FSB, MVD, FAPSI, 
FIS, and other government ministries. According to ITAR-TASS, "The role of the 
commission's working body will be played by the staff of the Security Council." 
(27 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-17) 
 
While the aim of the creation of this military council would initially seem to 
suggest a counterweight to the Security Council, much as the now-defunct 
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Defense Council seemed to serve, the membership, although impressive, would 
seem too large and unwieldy to strike an effective balance. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Council session addresses crises 
Security Council members at the 25 May meeting heard reports on the miners' 
strikes and regional payment problems from Prime Minister Kirienko and on the 
instability in the North Caucasus region from MVD Chief Sergei Stepashin. As a 
result of the reports, the council instructed the government to establish crisis 
committees to address each issue. (ITAR-TASS, 25 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-145) 
 
New deputy appointed 
Aleksei Molyakov has been named deputy secretary of the Security Council and 
Leonid Mayorov has been removed from this position, reportedly in connection 
with another job. (ITAR-TASS, 1 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-152) 
 
Kokoshin on US visit 
Security Council Secretary Andrei Kokoshin was in the United States this week 
for meetings with President Clinton, various defense and security officials, and 
Congressional leaders. The topics of these consultations included the developing 
situation in Kosovo and proliferation of nuclear weapons. (RIA-Novosti.com, 16 
Jun 98) 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Reform and reductions slated for MVD 
Addressing a session of the Council of Local Self-Government on 29 May, 
President Yel'tsin criticized the Ministry of Internal Affairs, claiming that "the 
whole system of the Interior Ministry should be changed." (ITAR-TASS, 29 May 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-149) A reform plan was quickly submitted to the president and 
approved on 15 June. The two-stage reform sets a target date of the year 2000 
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for a reduction of the total number of interior troops to 120,000-140,000. (RIA-
Novosti.com, 15 Jun 98) 
 
Apparat reform detailed 
Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko has announced a general 30 percent reduction of 
personnel in the government staff and proposed a reform of this support apparat 
aimed at eliminating redundant divisions and departments. 
 
According to ITAR-TASS (1 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-152), the reform envisages a 
reduction in the number of divisions from 38 to 21, a reduction in departments 
from 22 to 16, and the elimination of 8 secretariats for the premier and his 
deputies, leaving 4 in place. The total number of support staff is to fall from 1,450 
to 1,015. 
 
A spokesman for the Department of Government Information also announced 
that the number of this department's councils and commissions would be 
reduced by half, leaving approximately 50. Its departments will be organized into 
four broad categories: Macroeconomics and Finance; Industry, Agriculture & 
Infrastructure; Science, Technology, Culture and Foreign Relations; and Legal 
Issues and Legislative Relations. (ITAR-TASS, 1 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-152) 
 
Appointments/dismissals noted 
Aleksei Vasilevich Gordeev has been appointed Russian Federation first deputy 
minister of agriculture and food; Nikolai Kuzmich Dolgushkin has been appointed 
Russian Federation deputy minister of agriculture and food; Vladimir Petrovich 
Strashko has been released from the post of Russian Federation deputy minister 
of foreign economic relations and trade. 
 
Valentin Ivanovich Medvedev has been appointed deputy chief of the Russian 
Federation Ministry of Labor and Social Development Federal Labor 
Inspectorate--the main state inspector for labor protection. 
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Aleksandr Sergeevich Galaev has been released from the post of chief of the 
secretariat of R.G. Abdulatipov, Russian Federation government deputy 
chairman, in connection with Abdulatipov's departure from this post; Nikolai 
Stepanovich Anisimov has been released from the post of chief of the secretariat 
of F.R. Gazizullin, Russian Federation government deputy chairman and Russian 
Federation minister of state property, in connection with the departure of 
Gazizullin from this post; I. Shuvalov, Russian Federation deputy minister of state 
property, has been appointed acting chairman of the Russian Federal Property 
Fund for the period of I.B. Lipkin's illness; I.I. Shuvalov having been released 
from the post of Russian Federation deputy minister of state property for this 
period. (Rossiyskaya gazeta, 3 Jun 98, p. 6; FBIS-SOV-98-154) 
 
Chubais to return to government? 
In light of Russia's ongoing financial crisis, a new position is being created to 
serve as liaison between the government and the IMF and EBRD. Candidates 
are currently being considered for this post, titled the Personal Representative of 
the President for Interaction with International Financial Organizations, and 
Kirienko has suggested that Anatoli Chubais is the most likely man for the job. 
(RIA-Novosti.com, 17 Jun 98) 
 
The BBC World Service (18 Jun 98) reports that not only has Chubais already 
been named to this new post, but he has also submitted an appeal for an IMF 
bailout of between $10-15 billion. An IMF representative is due in Moscow to 
negotiate the terms of a bailout, which is aimed at creating a stabilization fund for 
the ruble and possibly providing budget deficit support. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By John McDonough and Ray Gaul 
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Russia 'confident' NATO cannot operate without UN go-ahead 
Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov outlined Russia's position on 
settlement of the Kosovo issue at a news conference in Bern on 2 June. He said 
that this position was characterized by "three noes." "The first no is with regard to 
preserving the status quo. We understand that this is impossible. The second no 
means no to solving the problem by letting Kosovo leave Serbia and Yugoslavia," 
the minister said. Moscow believes that Kosovo's secession "may lead to a war 
and bloodshed," which is why Russia supports the idea of "autonomy within 
Serbia, some elements of the autonomy being handled on the federal level." "The 
third no is a no to an international use of force without Yugoslavia's consent. 
Kosovo is, after all, an internal matter for Yugoslavia," Primakov added. (ITAR-
TASS, 1406 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-153) 
 
In conjunction with Primakov's remarks, Valeri Nesterushkin, a spokesman for 
the Russian foreign ministry, said Russia is confident that NATO cannot legally 
stage operations outside its scope without go-ahead from the UN Security 
Council. He claimed that this position was made known at the Russian-NATO 
meeting in Luxembourg which Primakov attended. Moscow does not want the 
precedent created of using NATO forces without UN Security Council approval, 
Nesterushkin said. He added that Russia "opposes any decisions leading to use 
of external force interfering in these problems." (Interfax, 1541 GMT, 2 Jun 98; 
FBIS-UMA-98-153) 
 
Albanian Partnership for Peace role discussed 
"Any use of NATO force outside the alliance's sphere is possible with a sanction 
of the UN Security Council alone," Russian foreign ministry spokesman Vladimir 
Rakhmanin told Interfax 9 June. However, he stated that Russia does not oppose 
NATO actions in Albania under the Partnership for Peace program. These 
actions include "holding limited-scale military exercises with humanitarian 
objectives and training military personnel," he said. (Interfax, 0958 GMT, 9 Jun 
98; FBIS-UMA-98-160) 
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Primakov continues to confirm Moscow's negative attitude to NATO's eastward 
expansion while speaking at a news conference in Helsinki at the end of his 
official visit to Finland. The incorporation into the alliance of former Soviet 
republics would disrupt Russian-NATO relations, he said. Answering a question 
by a Finnish reporter who described Russian-NATO relations as passive, 
Primakov dismissed that assessment and mentioned Russian involvement in the 
Partnership for Peace program, the operation in Bosnia, and bilateral 
consultations. He also stressed that former Soviet republics joining NATO would 
be "unacceptable" to Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1522 GMT, 1 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
152) 
 
Zhirinovsky delays START-II hearings 
The State Duma on 10 June supported a proposal by Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia Chairman Vladimir Zhirinovsky to cancel parliamentary hearings planned 
for 16 June on ratification of the START-II strategic arms reduction treaty. The 
decision was approved by 235 Duma deputies, nine more than the proposal 
needed to pass. Zhirinovsky told reporters that he does not oppose a meeting of 
parliamentarians and the defense, foreign and atomic energy ministers on 
START-II. However, he said, he is against giving such a meeting the status of 
parliamentary hearings. The Duma's Defense Committee decided earlier that 
such parliamentary hearings would be held in the fall, Zhirinovsky said. (Interfax, 
0930 GMT, 10 Jun 98; FBIS-TAC-98-161) 
 
Defense Committee Chairman Roman Popkovich of the Our Home is Russia 
faction said that, by cancelling the hearings, deputies "dealt a serious blow on 
prospects for development of the country's nuclear forces." Chairman of the 
Duma's Committee on International Affairs Vladimir Lukin said the voting was 
"senseless" because the meeting on 16 June will focus on the development of 
Russia's strategic nuclear forces rather than just ratification of START-II. 
(Interfax, 0930 GMT, 10 Jun 98; FBIS-TAC-98-161) 
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Russia needs ratification of the START-II treaty more than the United States 
does, Rakhmanin stated 22 May. Ratification of START-II is "a crucial issue from 
the point of view of Russia's security," he said at a roundtable meeting on the 
country's geopolitical priorities at the end of the century. Russia cannot afford to 
maintain a large quantity of missiles, he explained. "Their number needs to be 
reduced. A START-III is necessary for this purpose, which is impossible without 
START-II," Rakhmanin said. (Interfax, 1419 GMT, 22 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-142) 
 
Zyuganov holds talks in Cuba with Castro 
Russian Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov on 9 June met with Cuban 
leader Fidel Castro. According to the official communique, the Communist 
leaders had a wide-ranging talk on inter-party ties and building up the long-
standing Russian-Cuban relations. Zyuganov, visiting Cuba at the invitation of 
the Communist Party central committee, had harsh words for the United States' 
blockade policy towards Cuba, describing it as "unjust and inhuman." Zyuganov 
also met with State Council deputy chairman Carlos Lage Davila, who is in 
charge of the economy and is seen as a prime mover of Cuban-style reforms 
which leave in place total state controls. (ITAR-TASS, 0610 GMT, 10 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-161) 
 
Yel'tsin says Russia's foreign policy remains unchanged, multifaceted  
President Boris Yel'tsin told several foreign ambassadors on 28 May that Russia 
will continue to pursue a multi-faceted policy in the international arena. While 
receiving credentials from 13 ambassadors, including the ambassadors of Israel, 
North Korea, and Turkey, Yel'tsin stated that "our goal is a multi-polar world, 
(and) cooperation between large and small countries should be developed for 
this purpose." Yel'tsin stated that, even though a new government had been 
formed in Russia, there would not be a change in "principled policy." (Interfax, 
1012 GMT, 28 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-148) 
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The Russian envoy to the United Nations described any sanctions against either 
India or Pakistan as unjust from the international, legal, political and humanitarian 
points of view, foreign ministry official Vladimir Rakhmanin told a briefing in 
Moscow 9 June. Speaking at a meeting on adoption of UN Security Council 
resolution No. 1172 on the nuclear tests staged by the two countries, the envoy 
"emphasized Russia's readiness to help India and Pakistan reach reconciliation 
and cooperation through direct dialogue," Rakhmanin said. The envoy 
"expressed the conviction that common ground can be found in the approaches 
of India and Pakistan without elevating the existing problems to the international 
level and that they can be helped to find an agreement through bilateral talks," he 
said. (Interfax, 1634 GMT, 9 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-160) 
 
The Russian foreign ministry "intends vigorously to help Russian foreign trade 
organizations" join the UN oil-for-food operation, Valeri Nesterushkin, a 
spokesman for the ministry, told a briefing in Moscow on 2 June. Russia 
"attaches great importance to the success of this humanitarian operation," he 
said. Russian companies must be involved in "both the purchase of Iraqi oil and 
the supply to Baghdad of humanitarian goods, above all Russian-made ones," he 
said. Under a new UN plan approved by the secretary-general on 29 May, Iraq 
will export up to $5.2 billion worth of oil over the coming six months. (Interfax, 
1513 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-153) 
 
Foreign ministers meet in ASEAN forum 
Moscow hosted a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 3 June. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigori 
Karasin explained the ASEAN position: Russia, China, the United States and 
Japan are the guarantors of security in the Asia Pacific region and should 
become a "political vanguard to make the countries in the region feel secure." 
However, ASEAN Secretary General Rudolfo Severino, while welcoming 
Russia's participation, stated that the association is centered around the belief 
that all ASEAN states are equal and that each contributes to the security of the 
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Asia-Pacific region. (ITAR-TASS, 1356 GMT, 3 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-154, and 
ITAR-TASS, 2102 GMT, 4 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-155) 
 
Ethnic Koreans in Sakhalin 
Discussions have continued on the issue of how to repatriate or compensate 
ethnic Koreans left in Sakhalin after Japan's defeat in World War II. Russia has 
called for Japan to finance any final agreement. A survey conducted indicated 
that, of the 30,000 ethnic Koreans in Sakhalin, 5,000 wish to return to South 
Korea. (Yonhap, 0208 GMT, 8 Jun 98; FBIS-EAS-98-158, and Interfax, 1408 
GMT, 11 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-162) However, lack of an agreement with Japan 
and Korea on how best to deal with the ethnic Koreans living in Sakhalin could 
have a negative impact on efforts to improve relations with the two countries. 
 
More developments in fishing disputes 
The Russian-Japanese intergovernmental agreement on fishing signed in 
February 1988 took effect on 21 May. (Kyodo, 21 May 98; FBIS-EAS-98-141) 
Russian diplomats in Tokyo have stated that Russian inspectors will begin to 
monitor Japanese fishing activity in the South Kurile Islands. Under the 
agreement, Japan is allowed to fish in the 12-mile zone of the islands of Iturup, 
Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai. In turn, Russian inspectors will monitor the 
amount of fish caught by Japanese vessels and will conduct inspections at sea 
and in Japanese ports. It is important to note that these inspectors do not have 
the ability to penalize violators. The accord further demonstrates a softening in 
relations between the two countries over the contentious Kurile islands issue. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0756 GMT, 25 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-145) 
 
On 25 May, however, Russian border guards demonstrated that they have not 
completely come to an agreement on how best to monitor fishing in Russian 
coastal waters when they shot and killed two members of a Chinese fishing 
vessel that had been operating in a Russian economic zone. The border guards 
allegedly fired after the two Chinese ships failed to respond to warning signals. 
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The Chinese Embassy in Russia stated that it "deeply regretted" the "unpleasant 
event." China asserted that Russia should have attempted to resolve the issue 
without the loss of lives. In response, the Russian foreign ministry offered regrets 
but justified the shooting through Russian legislation and international law. The 
ministry also offered to present all evidence proving that the vessel had operated 
illegally. (Interfax, 1300 GMT, 29 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-149, and ITAR-TASS, 
1114 GMT, 29 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-149) 
 
High-level visits scheduled 
Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto is scheduled to travel to Moscow 
and St. Petersburg in October 1998. The agenda for the visit was established in 
an informal discussion between Hashimoto and Yel'tsin in April and will focus 
primarily on the Kurile island dispute. Diplomatic trips by Prime Minister Sergei 
Kirienko (July) and Japanese Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi (September) will 
precede Hashimoto's trip. (ITAR-TASS, 1521 GMT, 27 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
147) Additionally, Admiral Kazuya Natsukawa, head of the Japanese Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, made a first-ever visit to Russia to discuss security issues. The visit 
came amidst announcements for more joint exercises between the two navies. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0919 GMT, 1 Jun 98; FBIS-UMA-98-152, and ITAR-TASS, 0010 
GMT 31, May 98; FBIS-UMA-98-151) During his visit, Natsukawa discussed 
demilitarization in the Kurile island region, however, no major breakthroughs 
were reported. 
 
Meanwhile, a number of diplomatic meetings have been scheduled both in 
Moscow and Seoul over the course of the summer now that Russia has 
expressed a desire to better relations with South Korea. Prime Minister Oleg 
Sysuev will visit Korea, most likely in July. This visit will be the first "contact with 
the new leadership of the Republic of Korea" and Russia has called the meeting 
very important. A central topic will be discussion of Russia's debt payments to 
South Korea. The debt payments pose a problem for both countries as both are 
experiencing economic crises. In addition, a Russian-South Korean friendship 
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will likely prove pivotal in resolving the ongoing conflict between North and South 
Korea. Diplomatic statements have already reflected Russia's willingness to 
cooperate with South Korea on such matters. (ITAR-TASS, 0959 GMT, 11 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-162) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Fortunes of the NDR continue to change 
Ever since Viktor Chernomyrdin's dismissal as prime minister, the fortunes of his 
Nash Dom Rossiya (NDR) party have been in question. Without the powerful 
anchor of a prime minister as party leader, the NDR no longer enjoys special 
access to the government and has been thrown into the Duma pit along with all 
the other smaller parties. With Chernomyrdin's departure, Vladimir Ryzhkov woke 
up one morning to find himself the highest-ranking party member with a position 
in government. He quickly moved to reassure those who monitor such things that 
the NDR remains an important player by showing, oddly, that the NDR is actually 
dependent upon other groups in parliament. "Our 'party of power' also consists of 
five or six totally unregistered factions. NDR is just one of them. There is the 
Chubays faction, the Nemtsov faction, and the Luzhkov faction and there is, 
evidently, the administration faction. They all together constitute the 'party of 
power' led by Boris Nikolayevich Yel'tsin." (Novoye vremya, 19 Apr 98, pp. 10-11; 
FBIS-SOV-98-134) 
 
But what exactly does this support for the president mean? If the NDR is the 
"party of power," it runs the risk of being merely a legislative appendage of the 
chief executive and his prime minister. Perhaps for this reason the party's Duma 
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faction leader, Aleksandr Shokhin, claimed that the NDR would not support (that 
is, be responsible for) the actions of the government because none of their party 
had been included in the new cabinet. 
 
What is interesting, however, is that Ryzhkov turned down an offer to become the 
head of the government apparatus, saying that he would not be partly 
responsible for government policy without the authority to control its direction. 
With his decision one might speculate that the NDR does not wish to resurrect 
the intimate relationship with the government it had enjoyed, or endured, while 
Chernomyrdin was prime minister. Perhaps the ex-prime minister wants a party 
platform from which to run for the presidency in the year 2000, and one that is 
untainted by the political squalor which routinely emanates from the president's 
office. (Interfax, 1404 GMT, 8 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-128) 
 
This supposition is supported by Chernomyrdin's recent actions. Following the 
route taken by many former political, military, and business notables, 
Chernomyrdin has decided to run for a seat in the Duma from the Orenburg 
Region. Should his electoral bid succeed, he would join others in the Duma with 
similar election profiles consisting of a seat in the Duma and a national party 
devoted entirely to the electoral fortunes of one particular candidate. (Interfax, 
0942 GMT, 10 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-130) 
 
But if Chernomyrdin's presidential candidacy is to be successful, he will have to 
muzzle comments of fellow party members such as Ryzhkov who, when asked if 
he gave to the destitute, answered that he did not believe such persons were 
truly indigent. Not only are such comments politically imprudent, they are morally 
callous and show either an amazing ignorance of the current state of Russian 
economic affairs or a total disregard for the needs of the people he is supposed 
to represent. (Novoye vremya, 19 Apr 98, pp. 10-11; FBIS-SOV-98-134) 
 
REGIONS 
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Former Nizhny Novgorod mayor-elect sentenced to jail 
The 44-year-old businessman Andrei Klimentev, who won the mayoral election in 
Nizhny Novgorod two months ago, was sentenced by the regional court's judicial 
board to six years in prison with a confiscation of his property. Klimentev was 
charged with the usual list of corruption charges--forgery, embezzlement, and 
bribery. He has ten days to file an appeal with the Supreme Court. 
 
On the surface, it would seem that a victory for the rule of law and for the public 
trust has been scored. And in some way this is true. But it must be pointed out 
that Klimentev somehow sits in disfavor with the former governor of the province 
and present king-maker, Boris Nemtsov. Without hard evidence no further 
inferences can be made, but other Russian politicians with similar histories have 
been allowed to take office. (ITAR-TASS World Service, 1110 GMT, 27 May 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-147) 
 
Lebed wins in Krasnoyarsk 
Political maverick and aspiring tsar Aleksandr Lebed won the gubernatorial 
election of the vast Siberian province. Responses from the political establishment 
ranged from Boris Yel'tsin's recognition that the people had spoken and their 
decision must be respected, to Vladimir Zhirinovsky's dire predictions that Russia 
was doomed. Lebed himself only said that his first and foremost goal was to 
improve the lives of the citizens of Krasnoyarsk, and that he had no immediate 
plans to run for the Russian presidency. 
 
Lebed has a great opportunity here. He can prove to the Russian electorate and 
to international investors that he is capable of running a large, diverse, and 
economically challenged region. But in order to do this he will have to keep his 
mouth shut and act like a statesman. It would be a mistake to simply pack his 
bags and take up permanent residence in the Federation Council. In Krasnoyarsk 
he is tsar, while in Moscow he must contend with the actions of other senators, 
the Duma, the prime minister, the president, and the mayor. By staying in 
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Krasnoyarsk, he can largely manage his own fortunes, and on occasion make 
"state visits" to Moscow with the resulting triumphalism of a popular politician 
who "understands the little guy" and is unscathed by the byzantine politics of 
Constantinople on the Moskva. (AFP (North European Service), 1810 GMT, 17 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-137) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Dwyer Dennis and CDR Curtis Stevens 
 
Delivery of S-300 to Cyprus is nearing 
Though some media reports indicated that the S-300 missile air defense systems 
destined for Cyprus had already arrived, both Russian and Cypriot sources have 
denied delivery. In fact, on 10 June Col. Gen. Anatoli Kornukov announced that 
Cypriot servicemen will test the system at a base near Astrakhan, a city on the 
Caspian Sea, later this month. Apparently to counteract Turkish desire for 
preventing the deployment of this advanced air defense system on Cyprus, 
Kornukov also said that the decision of whether the delivery would be entrusted 
to the Russian air force will be made in August or September. (Interfax, 1219 
GMT, 10 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-161) 
 
The Cypriot foreign minister, Yiannakis Cassoulides, also has denied that 
delivery occurred while reemphasizing the need for "adequate strengthening of 
Cyprus air defense." In response to the concern voiced by the international 
community and specifically Turkey on Cyprus's December 1997 purchase 
decision, Cassoulides stressed that criticism should be "voiced simultaneously 
with the concern over the presence of the 35,000 Turkish military contingent..." 
The Turkish troops have occupied 37 percent of Cyprus since 1974 in the face of 
UN Security Council resolutions which called for their withdrawal. (ITAR-TASS, 
0755 GMT, 24 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-144) 
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Despite political pressure to annul the contract, a Russian foreign ministry 
spokesman confirmed on 9 June that Russia will deliver the S-300 systems, 
repeating an earlier claim that "Russia is a reliable partner." The spokesman, 
however, seemed to leave room for the idea that the need for delivery could be 
eliminated with the demilitarization of the island. (Interfax, 1120 GMT, 9 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-160) 
 
As delivery time nears and Turkey steps up its inspections of shipping through 
the Dardanelles, tensions will be sure to increase. The use of air delivery will 
obviously help to circumvent Turkey's efforts--if it is truly feasible for the Russian 
air force. Despite assurances from Col. Gen. Kornukov that military air transport 
is up to the task, the An-124 crash and the resulting loss of two Su-27 fighters 
bound for Vietnam may make both the customer and seller somewhat nervous. 
While it is likely that maintainability and reliability have not increased during the 
prolonged budget woes (see May 1998 Digest entry on Russian aviation), 
Russia's military air transport is obviously technically capable. If the S-300 
systems are delivered by air, the big question is what will be Turkey's recourse? 
 
Two killed in SU-24 crash 
On 10 June, two pilots died when their Russian Su-24 combat aircraft exploded 
while preparing to land at a military airfield outside Ostrov in the northwestern 
region of Pskov. The crash was the result of an apparent midair explosion 
approximately 300 meters from the end of the runway. (ITAR-TASS, 1034 GMT, 
10 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-161, and Mayak Radio Network, 1630 GMT, 10 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-161) 
 
The Su-24 is a twin-engined supersonic tactical bomber attack aircraft. This 
particular aircraft was registered to the Baltic Fleet. Reportedly, the aircraft had 
undergone technical and maintenance servicing prior to its flight from 
Chernyakhovsk to Ostrov. While most recent accidents and incidents have 
occurred due to poor training (such as insufficient flight hours), the unexpected 
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and sudden explosion indicated a mechanical failure. (NTV, 1200 GMT, 10 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-161) 
 
Today in Russia, current average accumulated flight hours are nearly one-tenth 
of the annual operational requirement. This lack of training can have obvious 
repercussions. But while flight hours may be easier to quantify, no less 
detrimental to safety and operational effectiveness are the hours allotted for 
maintenance training and quality assurance. With recent reports of spare parts 
shortages to hinder further proper maintenance, it is little wonder that such 
incidents occur. 
 
Yel'tsin gives Border Guards slap on the back and the ax simultaneously  
On 28 May, Russian President Boris Yel'tsin congratulated the border troops on 
the 80th anniversary of the Federal Border Guard Service's (FBS) founding. 
Yel'tsin specifically praised the pace of reform and the renewed interaction 
between the FBS and other security and law enforcement structures. In 
discussing future tasks, he emphasized the need for an increase in the defense 
of Russia's biological resources. Despite cuts to date of nearly 30 percent (of 
which the majority has been redundant administrative bureaucracy), actual troop 
strengths have been somewhat protected. On 8 June, though, Yel'tsin signed a 
decree dissolving the Amur river border guard flotilla. It appears that this is really 
only part of continued organizational restructuring. Col. Gen. Aleksei 
Shcherbakov, deputy director of the FBS, said that the ships, launches, and 
divisions would be kept. (ITAR-TASS, 1126 GMT, 21 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-142, 
ITAR-TASS, 1340 GMT, 8 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-159, and Interfax, 1131 GMT, 
28 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-148) 
 
Since so far actual troop strength is being maintained and only the administrative 
portion seems to be undergoing "streamlining," terms akin to consolidation of 
power come to mind. One would not want to read too much into these reductions, 
however. The border guard troops have, for the most part, been kept current in 
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pay, unlike their Ministry of Defense counterparts. This cutting away at the "paper 
pushers" is apparently increasing efficiency and permitting operations within 
budget. From where are the funds flowing to meet the budget? Perhaps cities are 
part of the source, given the recent naming of the warship Moskva. Or perhaps, 
in their own form of privatization, the border troops are self-funding as they 
"monitor" the flow of contraband across territorial lines. 
 
Defense ministry holds high-level talks 
The warm spring weather seems to have been a reason for travel by senior 
military officials from a number of countries. The Russian defense ministry 
conducted the following high level meetings in May and June: 
 
-- Members of a French military delegation led by Dominique de Nayves, 
diplomatic advisor to the French defense minister, and Jean-Claude Malet, head 
of the French defense ministry Strategic Research Department, held talks with 
their Russian counterparts which included a meeting with Marshal Sergeev. 
These talks constituted the first round of a series of planned Franco-Russian 
exchanges on the new European security structure, NATO expansion, military 
doctrine and nuclear issues. (ITAR-TASS, 1537 GMT, 27 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
148) 
 
-- Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Nikolai Mikhailov led the Russian 
delegation to talks in South Korea the week of 1 June. Both sides noted the 
military cooperation already taking place and planned ship visits, meetings 
between general staffs, a defense minister visit, and cadet exchanges at military 
academies. Additionally the Russians view South Korea as a potential lucrative 
market for arms sales. (ITAR-TASS, 0808 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-153) 
 
-- Japan's chairman of the Self-Defense Forces' Joint Staff Council, Admiral 
Kazuya Natsukawa, commenced a tour of Russia on 1 June. Japan's top officer 
was scheduled to meet with Marshal Sergeev as well as with the chiefs of all the 
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Russian services. He was also in Moscow to firm up plans for a joint Russian-
Japanese naval exercise scheduled for July. As with the ongoing Korean visit, 
the Russians expressed a desire to sell military equipment to the Japanese. 
(Jamestown Foundation Monitor, 3 Jun 98) 
 
-- Commander-in-chief of the US Strategic Command, General Habiger, held 
talks with his Russian counterpart during the first week of June. In addition to 
touring Russian strategic facilities, the general pushed General Yakovlev, 
commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, on START-II ratification. (ITAR-
TASS, 1048 GMT, 6 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-157) 
 
-- Marshal Sergeev was scheduled to visit Belgium from 9-12 June, to hold talks 
with Belgian military leaders, and to attend a session of the Russia-NATO 
Council. (Interfax, 1603 GMT, 7 June 1998; FBIS-SOV-98-158) 
 
More grim statistics 
7 January, 17 January and 27 May are three special days in the Russian armed 
forces for the first five months of 1998: These are the only three days in which a 
Russian serviceman did not die of a non-combat death, according to Vladimir 
Kulakov, head of the army's Main Department for Educational Work. (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 1 Jun 98) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Ray Gaul 
 
Berezovsky enters Abkhazia discussions 
In an attempt to "create a general atmosphere which would help make [Georgian-
Abkhaz peace negotiations] especially effective," Boris Berezovsky met with 
negotiators in the conflict in June. (Interfax, 1008 GMT, 5 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
156) Berezovsky succeeded in getting Georgian President Shevardnadze and 
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Abkhazian President Ardzinba to meet. Officials had differing reactions to the 
news of Berezovsky's involvement. Russian presidential envoy for CIS states 
Ivan Rybkin said, "Berezovsky can contribute much to the Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflict settlement." (Interfax, 0830 GMT, 8 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-159) "The 
Abkhazian side is ready to cooperate with all who can offer real assistance to the 
process of settlement," Ardzinba stated. (ITAR-TASS, 1718 GMT, 10 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-161) Meanwhile, Shevardnadze expressed the opinion that 
Berezovsky's powers to influence the peace settlement are limited. (Interfax, 
0758 GMT, 3 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-154). Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris 
Pastukhov stated, "conflicts are usually not settled by fleeting visits." (Interfax, 
1542 GMT, 3 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-154). 
 
Berezovsky tours Central Asia 
Berezovsky embarked on a tour of Central Asia beginning 26 May. He visited 
Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Dushanbe (Tajikistan), Tashkent, (Uzbekistan), Ashgabat 
(Turkmenistan) and Almaty (Kazakhstan). The trip focused on discovering the 
individual concerns of each of the presidents over CIS relations with the aim of 
strengthening bilateral relations with member states. All parties involved stressed 
the need to develop economic ties. The presidents expressed confidence in 
Berezovsky's abilities and emphasized his plan to involve business leaders in 
CIS decision-making. They also expressed their desire to reform the CIS but 
each had different views on how to do so. 
 
Two distinct proposals for reform did emerge. The first proposal calls for the CIS 
to undergo a drastic reorganization. This would permanently change the way the 
organization functions and would emphasize economic cooperation as the 
primary function of the Commonwealth. The second proposal calls for the 
optimization of executive body activities. This would leave the overall CIS 
structure intact and would reflect a desire to make alterations which could better 
serve member states. (ITAR-TASS, 2038 GMT, 29 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-149). 
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Tyhypko and Agapov named to CIS posts 
On 29 May, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Tyhypko was named 
chairman of the presidium on the CIS Interstate Economic Committee. (Interfax, 
1158 GMT, 29 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-149) On 9 June, Boris Agapov, former 
deputy secretary of the Russian Security Council, was appointed as deputy to 
Berezovsky. Previously, Berezovsky and Agapov worked together on the 
Security Council on relations with Chechnya. (Interfax, 1504 GMT, 9 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-160) 
 
While such staff changes have caused few ripples, a proposal to relocate CIS 
headquarters obtained a much stronger reaction. Belarus, the current host of CIS 
headquarters in Minsk, opposes any changes in the location of CIS 
administrative bodies. The topic is scheduled to be discussed at the special CIS 
forum beginning in mid-June. Berezovsky expressed a desire to move half of the 
Executive Secretariat to Moscow. (Interfax, 1542 GMT, 3 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
154) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Monica Florescu 
 
MOLDOVA 
New government approved by parliament 
With a vote of 59 to 36, the Moldovan parliament passed a vote of confidence in 
the new government led by Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc on 21 May. The new 
cabinet has four deputy prime ministers, a state minister, and 16 ministers. Some 
of the same ministers were retained in the cabinet, while no members from the 
Communist Party were selected. Ion Sturza of the Bloc for Democratic and 
Prosperous Moldova has been appointed deputy premier and minister of 
economy and reform. Other deputy prime ministers are Valentin Dolganiuc and 
Nicolae Andronic (both of the Democratic Convention). Dolganiuc will be in 
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charge of industrial and agrarian policies, while Andronic was put in charge of 
legal issues. The fourth deputy premier is Oleg Stratulat of the Party of 
Democratic Forces. He will be responsible for social policy and sciences. Nicolae 
Cernomaz continues to hold the state minister post. (Infotag, 1730 GMT, 21 May 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-141) 
 
Possible friction might come about from the two factions which felt ignored during 
the creation of the new government, namely the Communist Party (CPU) and the 
Democratic Convention of Moldova (CDM), the largest faction of the ruling 
Alliance for Democratic Forces (ADR). Although the Communist Party remains in 
the opposition, it will continue its parliamentary work in this new capacity, leader 
Vladimir Voronin stated at a news conference. He refuted rumors that the 
Communists were allegedly going to give up their 40 mandates to provoke a 
parliamentary crisis. (Infotag, 1850 GMT, 26 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-146) At the 
same time, the leader of CDM, former president Mircea Snegur, voiced his 
objections to the new government, stating, "They are trying to push us aside so 
that we could not have any influence on the government." He stated firmly that if 
the CDM's opinion was ignored, the convention would return to the initial position 
and insist on its own candidates for minister of foreign affairs and national 
security. (Infotag, 1500 GMT, 21 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-141) CDM has 
repeatedly threatened to become an obstacle in the parliamentary process if its 
demands are ignored (see previous Digest), however, party members have 
proven unable thus far to force through any candidates. 
 
Plans for reform 
The main task of the new cabinet is to finalize the transition to the market 
economy, according to President Petru Lucinschi. He underlined the importance 
of the cooperation between the new cabinet, the chief of state and the 
parliamentary majority, as well as the constructive dialogue with the opposition. 
(Basapress, 1700 GMT, 25 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-145) According to Deputy 
Premier and Minister of Economy and Reform Ion Sturza, the new government 
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needs at least two years to stabilize the economic situation. (Basapress, 1730 
GMT, 29 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-149) During the cabinet's first sitting, Sturza 
submitted a draft anti-crisis program consisting of 56 items. In the drafters' 
opinion, many governmental structures should duplicate the work of each other. 
The drafters stated that it is necessary to reorganize the governmental system, 
as well as reduce apparatus staff and expenditures by 25-30 percent. The 
program envisages a heavier taxation for certain population categories, 
toughening sanctions against dishonest economic agents, and denial of the 
mutual settlement practice. The draft of the new program is expected to be 
refined and submitted for parliament's consideration in early July. (Infotag, 1430 
GMT, 5 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-156) 
 
Communists to cooperate with left-wing parties 
The Communist Party and three left-wing formations have begun active 
consultations on founding a left bloc to begin preparing for the local elections to 
be held in early 1999. In an effort to form a strong opposition bloc, Communist 
Party leader Vladimir Voronin stated, "In the face of a real threat of actions by 
national radicals and Romanian unionists, it is just our duty to unite all healthy 
forces of the society in the struggle for our sovereign Moldova." (Infotag, 1900 
GMT, 1 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-152) At the same time, the Socialist Unity Bloc 
(BUS) is to be converted into a party that will enter into a coalition with other 
leftist forces, as was decided at the third congress of the Socialist Unity. 
Observers are not ruling out that the "union of left forces," which may be joined 
by the once-ruling but currently non-parliamentary Agrarian Democratic Party, 
may be set up under the aegis of the Communist Party. (Infotag, 1855 GMT, 2 
Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-153) 
 
Transdniestr constitution remains unchanged 
Some time ago, a group of local parliamentarians initiated the decision to divide 
the executive and presidential powers in the Dniestr republic, and to introduce 
the post of prime minister into the state power structure. They demanded the 
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conversion of Dniestr into a parliamentary republic and to restrict presidential 
plenary powers. Until now, President Igor Smirnov has been heading the region's 
executive power as well, while all the current governmental work is coordinated 
by the deputy prime minister. The final word on governmental decisions is left for 
the president, who is also prime minister. Such a situation fails to suit some 
parliamentarians and state administration officials, especially since Igor Smirnov 
spent several long periods in the hospital, and his absence often led to difficulties 
at operative decisions. Smirnov stood up with an initiative of his own: to convert 
Dniestr into a presidential republic, which would allow the parliament broader 
powers as well, while the president would be preoccupied with executive power 
problems and would lead the power structures. Despite the proposals, however, 
parliament has decided to leave the constitution unchanged. (Infotag, 1900 GMT, 
1 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-152) 
 
Ukrainian forces to be deployed to Transdniestr 
The Ukrainian president's emissary in charge of the Dniestr settlement process, 
Yevhen Levytsky, said that, in keeping with the Odessa Agreement, Ukrainian 
military observers are being deployed to the no-man's zone separating Dniestrian 
and Moldovan military and paramilitary units. Local residents were reportedly 
watching the deployment process with a great degree of interest, hoping for the 
resumption of traffic via the Dubossary bridge, restoration on which was 
completed long ago. Ukraine's mediating mission to Moldova's breakaway 
province is rumored to have a big price tag, but will most likely do little to boost 
Ukraine's influence within the region, which is home to over 200,000 ethnic 
Ukrainians. (Intelnews, 0113 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-UMA-98-153) 
 
UKRAINE 
NATO: Closer partnership with Ukraine 
NATO and Ukraine agreed to deepen their military ties ahead of next year's 
expansion of the alliance up to the former Soviet republic's border. After talks 
with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk, NATO Secretary-General Javier 
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Solana announced plans to station a permanent liaison officer in Kyiv to boost 
cooperation between allied and Ukrainian armed forces. The officer's main task 
will be to help Ukraine draw up a program of joint military exercises with NATO 
under the alliance's Partnership for Peace (PfP). (AFP (North European Service), 
0944 GMT, 29 May 98; FBIS-WEU-98-149) 
 
Ukraine intends to join the European Union 
Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoytenko, speaking at the opening meeting of the 
Ukrainian-European Union Cooperation Council, said flat out that Ukraine's 
strategic goal is to become a full member of the European Union. The prime 
minister said Luxembourg has done much to ensure that Ukraine is treated in 
Europe in accordance with its status and role on the continent. "We would like to 
participate in the European conference of European Union member states and 
candidates for membership," Pustovoytenko told journalists after the morning 
meeting. "However, we do not hide the fact that our strategic goal is to become a 
full member." The European Union has stopped well short in the past of 
indicating that Ukraine stands any chance of qualifying for entry in the EU within 
the near future. (Intelnews, 0022 GMT, 10 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-161) 
 
Ukraine's decision to announce its intentions to join the European Union and 
have closer collaboration with NATO casts a shadow on its relations with Russia. 
After a meeting held between the secretary of the Ukrainian National Security 
and Defense Council, Vladimir Gorbulin, and Russian foreign minister Yevgeni 
Primakov in Kyiv last week, differences of opinion regarding the issue of 
European security between Russia and Ukraine became even more evident. 
Ratification of the Russian-Ukrainian "big" treaty (the bilateral treaty on 
friendship) had been postponed by Russia because of Tarasyuk's statements on 
NATO. (Interfax, 1020 GMT, 27 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-147) 
 
Miners protest 
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A crisis regarding protests of miners demanding to get paid for their work has 
escalated to include almost all major Ukrainian coal industry enterprises. 
Production at most coal mines has been almost paralyzed. Even before the 
protests, the highest-capacity Menzhinskiy coal mine had been at a standstill for 
the past 18 months following a fire. As a result, last year the miners of all the coal 
mines managed to produce about 1,200,000 tonnes of coal, which accounted for 
less than two percent of the aggregate amount produced in Ukraine. (ITAR-
TASS, 1121 GMT, 25 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-145) The miners began holding 
hunger strikes on 20 May. This was followed by marches to Kyiv: one thousand 
miners from western Donetsk Region started their march on Kyiv on 24 May, 
demanding that the 11 associations of Pavlohradugol receive their wages, worth 
84 million hryvnyas (nearly $42 million). The miners also demanded that the 
industry receive state subsidies, without which (as the last 18 subsidy-free 
months showed) the Ukrainian coal industry will cease to exist. (ITAR-TASS 
World Service, 1107 GMT, 24 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-144) 
 
The government first assessed the protests as a "planned political action staged 
by the leaders of the Communist and the Hromada parliamentary factions." 
(UNIAR, 1545 GMT, 23 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-143) However, wages did start to 
be distributed to the miners. In addition, negotiations went on between 
government officials and mining trade unions. (UT-1 Television Network, 1500 
GMT, 25 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-145) 
 
On 28 May, the government fully settled its debts to the coal sector for the first 
five months of this year as part of the state budget subsidy. The government has 
ensured that regions pay for their electric power and especially energy coal debts 
from state subsidies earmarked for these regions by transferring the money 
directly to the mines, bypassing middlemen. (Ukrayinske Radio First Program 
Network, 1200 GMT, 28 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-149) In addition, the World Bank 
office in Ukraine stated that it was ready to grant Kyiv the second tranche of 
US$150 million for closing unprofitable mines. The Ukrainian side has already 
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used the first tranche of the same size. Three mines were closed last year. 
According to a decision by the government, the country is to close down 32 
collieries between 1996 and 1999, resulting in the layoff of over 63,000 persons. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0910 GMT, 28 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-148) 
 
Deadlock in efforts to select a new speaker 
On 21 May four parliamentary factions--the People's Democratic (PDP), Social-
Democratic (United), People's Rukh, and the Green parties--announced their 
intention not to participate in the election of the speaker of the Supreme Council 
scheduled for the following day. They also withdrew their parties' candidates for 
the position of parliament speaker. The right-wing/centrist factions decided to do 
so following the leftist factions' refusal to elect the speaker and his two deputies 
in "a package" (i.e., by a single vote). PDP Leader Anatoliy Matviyenko told 
reporters that the Hromada faction, which had not joined the right-wing/centrists 
in their decision to abstain from voting in the election of the speaker, is most 
likely to form a union with left-wing factions. The four factions' decision made it 
impossible to hold the voting scheduled for 22 May. (Infobank, 1903 GMT, 21 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-141) 
 
Parliament then began nominating candidates for speaker again on 27 May. With 
the mid-May decision by Oleksandr Moroz and the temporary ruling 
parliamentary presidium to allow candidates who ran in the first round of 
elections to present themselves again for election in the second round 
(previously parliament's internal rules forbade this), parliament deputies decided 
to do away with speaker campaign speeches and presentations. As a result, 
Communist Party boss Petro Symonenko, who received the lion's share of the 
votes cast--mostly by leftists--in the first round, competed in the second round. 
Hromada's Oleksandr Yelyashkevych also competed in the second round, while 
Vasyl Onopenko, the only other candidate nominated, withdrew his candidacy. 
According to Ivan Chizh, one of the leaders of the Socialist Party/Peasant faction, 
the right and center deputies were blocking the election because they had no 
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strong candidate themselves, and did not want a leftist candidate to be elected. 
The boycotting deputies say they abandoned the voting because of their 
opponents' refusal to agree to nominate the speaker and his two deputies in a 
package. (Intelnews, 0028 GMT, 27 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-147) 
 
In the runoff ballot held on 4 June, the speaker was not elected as neither 
candidate gained the necessary 226 votes required. According to the results of 
the voting, 423 of the 439 elected MPs received ballots, but only 382 MPs 
participated in the voting: 173 MPs voted for Leonid Kravchuk, member of the 
Social Democratic party (United); 178 MPs selected Petro Symonenko, leader of 
Ukrainian Communists; 14 lawmakers voted for neither candidate; and 17 ballots 
were found invalid. Speakers of two previous Supreme Councils were nominated 
for the following round--Ivan Plyushch (People's Democratic Party's faction) and 
Oleksandr Moroz (Left Center faction, leader of the Socialist Party). Five 
additional candidates were in the running: Oleksandr Pukhkalo (Hromada 
faction), Oleksandr Ryabchenko (the Green Party faction) and three MPs who 
belong to no faction--Volodymyr Semynozhenko, Ihor Nasalyk and Valentyn 
Zubov. (Infobank, 1538 GMT, 5 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-156) 
 
New government established in Crimea 
A coalition government of the Crimean autonomy was established on 27 May. 
The new government predominantly consists of representatives of the 
Communist Party, the People's Democratic Party of Ukraine (NDPU) and the 
"Soyuz" (Union) Party. Sergei Kunitsyn, mayor of the city of Perekop and leader 
of the NDRU regional department, was appointed to the post of Crimean prime 
minister. Ukrainian Prime Minister and NDPU leader Valeriy Pustovoytenko 
stressed that the Crimean autonomy currently had two leaders--Communist 
leader Leonid Grach and NDPU regional department chief Kunitsyn, adding that 
the two men had been demonstrating good mutual understanding. The newly 
appointed prime minister promised to submit his proposals on reorganization of 
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the cabinet in two weeks' time. (ITAR-TASS, 1120 GMT, 27 May 98; FBIS-SOV-
98-147) 
 
BELARUS 
Regional security zone considered between Belarus and Russia 
Russia and Belarus "will be able to start the formation of a regional army group 
once the legislatures of the two countries ratify the 1997 agreement on joint 
provision of regional military security," Aleksandr Bevzo, head of the Special 
Program Board on the Executive Committee of the Union of Russia and Belarus, 
stated on 27 May. "If a political decision to this effect is made, a common 
defense area may be set up eventually," he said. "The Union of Russia and 
Belarus Executive Council will consider soon a joint program of training 
Belarusian servicemen in Russian military schools," Bevzo said. "The Union of 
Russia and Belarus, which aims for stable socioeconomic development of the 
two countries, has a right to have mechanisms designed to protect its integrating 
development and interests in the areas where unscrupulous neighbors are likely 
to make unjustified claims," Bevzo said. However, in line with the Concept of 
Joint Defense Policy agreed to in January 1998, Moscow and Minsk do not 
regard any country or coalition as their enemy, he said. (Interfax, 1558 GMT, 27 
May 98; FBIS-UMA-98-148) 
 
Changes proposed for the presidency 
Presidential administration chief Mikhail Myasnikovich said that the concept of 
the effective state proposed by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka was aimed at 
raising the status of the state leader as a guarantor of the constitutional rights 
and freedoms of citizens and that legislators should take this into account when 
working out their bills. He also believes that a more important role should be 
given to the presidential administration and the national center of legislative 
activity attached to it. (Belapan, 0930 GMT, 29 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-149) 
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The Belarusian parliament approved at the first reading on 4 June a draft law 
envisioning tough penalties for insulting the head of state. Under the document, 
sent to parliament by Lukashenka, insulting him in public can be punished by four 
years imprisonment while repeated offenses, including those using the media, 
can lead to a five-year prison term. Stiff fines or administrative arrests will be 
imposed on those who appear in public places with posters which insult the 
honor and dignity of the president. Media executives are also liable for heavy 
fines if they allow the release of materials defaming Lukashenka. (ITAR-TASS, 
1708 GMT, 4 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-155) 
 
Foreign envoy crisis escalates 
A standoff situation developed last week between Belarusian authorities and 
foreign envoys who refused to leave their homes, while Minsk was insisting that 
the embassies were long overdue for repairs. The foreign ministry apologized to 
the ambassadors living in the Drozdy village on the outskirts of the capital over 
the inconvenience linked with moving their residences. The foreign envoys say 
Lukashenka should intervene but, according to deputy chief of the presidential 
administration Ivan Pashkevich, there have been no formal requests from 
diplomats. In addition, Moscow expressed concern over the situation. (ITAR-
TASS, 1307 GMT, 9 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-160) 
 
On 10 June, Lukashenka said that all problems connected with the relocation of 
foreign ambassadors from the Drozdy complex had been resolved. He stressed 
that Drozdy is the residence of the Belarusian president and foreign diplomatic 
missions are located just 30-50 meters from it. "We are ready to start repairing all 
lifeline support systems in Drozdy and we have built a new house for the 
diplomats to live in," he said. Responding to some diplomats' requests conveyed 
to Foreign Minister Ivan Antonovich by US Ambassador Daniel Spekhard, 
Lukashenka said the transfer had been postponed for a week. He pointed out 
that Belarus will observe earlier agreements with the diplomatic missions. "If 
someone had property in Drozdy, he will not lose it. The lease agreements will 
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remain in effect," he said. (ITAR-TASS, 1846 GMT, 10 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
161) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
President Nazarbaev establishes relations with Qatar, UAE 
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev visited Qatar and the United Arab 
Emirates at the end of May in order to discuss trade relations and the creation of 
stronger economic ties between his country and these two Gulf states. The 
Kazakh president's meeting with Qatar's Amir Hamad Bin-Khalifah Al Thani on 
23 May resulted in the signing of an agreement on cooperation between the two 
countries' chambers of commerce and industry, as well as an agreement to set 
up a Kazakh-Qatari council of entrepreneurs. The two governments also decided 
to establish embassies in each other's capital cities. (ITAR-TASS, 1626 GMT, 23 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-143) 
 
President Nazarbaev's visit to the United Arab Emirates (Dubai) produced even 
greater results: The governments of Qatar and the UAE agreed to grant jointly 
$100 million to Kazakhstan for the development of its new capital, Astana, as 
well as for the rehabilitation of that portion of Kazakh territory which borders the 
Aral Sea. (Kazakhstan appears to have oil and possibly natural gas resources 
located near the Aral Sea.) Qatar and the UAE have also agreed to cooperate in 
the development of Kazakhstan's oil and gas industries. (Interfax, 1137 GMT, 25 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-145) 
 
Japanese firms interested in developing Kazakh oil fields, pipelines 
Japanese companies have become engaged in exploring Kazakh offshore oil 
fields near Aktyubinsk and in the area northwest of the Aral Sea. Japanese oil 
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firms have also expressed interest in developing Kazakhstan's offshore Caspian 
oil fields and investing in new pipelines to transport Kazakh oil to other former 
Soviet republics. The companies are particularly interested in the Chinese-
Kazakh project to construct a pipeline link to Turkmenistan. (Interfax, 1327 GMT, 
29 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-149) 
 
Kazakh government hopes to resolve border dispute with China 
Kazakhstan's lower parliamentary chamber, the Majles, ratified the five-nation 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the Russian Federation, and the People's 
Republic of China) agreement on mutual reductions of troops along the Chinese 
border on 3 June 1998. (The agreement was signed approximately one year 
ago.) In addition to demilitarizing its border with China, the Kazakh government 
would also like to enter into negotiations to resolve the issue of more than 1,000 
km of disputed territory along the Chinese-Kazakh border. The Kazakh 
parliament has recommended postponing border-dispute discussions with China 
until Kazakhstan's economy is in a better state, but the Kazakh government 
advocates beginning negotiations as soon as possible. (Kazakh Television First 
Program Network, 1500 GMT, 3 Jun 98; FBIS-UMA-98-154) It seems that the 
Kazakh government may want to link the issue of its territorial disputes with 
China to the five-nation demilitarization agreement. This agreement will be the 
subject of a summit meeting to be held in Almaty on 3 July 1998, at which the 
five signatory countries will exchange information about their military and border 
troop forces, and wrap up the final details of the agreement. (Interfax, 1317 GMT, 
3 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-154) 
 
KYRGYZSTAN 
President Akaev has right to stand in third election 
At a business conference in London on 15 May, Kyrgyz Prime Minister 
Kubanychbek Jumaliev announced that President Askar Akaev is entitled to 
stand in a third presidential election because the new Kyrgyz constitution which 
limits the president to two terms was not adopted until 1993. Therefore, although 
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President Akaev has been elected (by the Kyrgyz parliament) to his post twice 
already, once in 1991 and again in 1996, the term limits set out by the new 
constitution only apply to elections which were held after 1993 .(Radio Tashkent 
Network, 0900 GMT, 15 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-135) 
 
Kyrgyz president advocates parliamentary electoral reform 
President Akaev declared his support for a reform of the Kyrgyz parliamentary 
electoral system at a conference on 4 June in Bishkek, titled "Improving the 
Election System of the Kyrgyz Republic." A draft electoral law formulated by 
Kyrgyz government and parliamentary representatives, UN officials, and 
members of other (unnamed) international organizations will soon be submitted 
to the Kyrgyz parliament. The draft law would eliminate multi-round parliamentary 
elections, as well as instituting a "winner-take-all" formula which would grant all 
of a particular voting district's parliamentary seats to whichever party received the 
most votes in that district. President Akaev also stated that the elections should 
be conducted "indirectly via district and local councils." The next parliamentary 
elections are scheduled to take place in the year 2000. (Interfax, 1150 GMT, 4 
Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-155) 
 
Kyrgyzstan will not join anti-Islamic troika 
On 18 May, presidential spokesman Kanybek Imanaliev announced that the 
Kyrgyz government does not wish to join the troika recently formed by Russia, 
Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to combat Muslim fundamentalism in Central Asia and 
in the Russian Federation (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1600 GMT, 18 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-138). Imanaliev did not provide any further details. 
 
Border patrol to assume Russian counterparts' duties by 2000 
On 20 May, Lieutenant Colonel Pavel' Vasko, commander of the Russian border 
troops in Kyrgyzstan, announced that Kyrgyz border guards will begin patrolling 
their country's borders by the end of this year, and that by the end of the year 
2000 Kyrgyzstan will guard all of its own borders. The Russian border troops are 
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to hand over their duties to their Kyrgyz counterparts in three stages: By the end 
of the current year Kyrgyz border guards will assume control of those sections of 
the border most frequently used by narcotics smugglers (this would be the Tajik-
Kyrgyz border, as well as some portions of the Kyrgyz-Chinese border); in 1999 
Kyrgyz border guards will take over the Russian guards' functions at Bishkek's 
Manas (international) Airport; and in the year 2000 the Kyrgyz border services 
will begin patrolling the remaining sections of the Kyrgyz-Chinese border. Lt. Col. 
Vasko cited financial reasons as the main impetus for handing his troops' border 
patrol duties over entirely to the Kyrgyz border services; currently, the Russian 
Federation is responsible for providing 80 percent of his troops' budget. (Interfax, 
1109 GMT, 20 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-140) 
 
TAJIKISTAN 
Tajik president, UTO set up commission to resolve political differences 
After two closed door meetings with United Tajik Opposition (UTO) Chairman 
Said Abdullo Nuri on 27 May (ITAR-TASS World Service, 0848 GMT, 27 May 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-147) and 2 June, President Imomali Rahmonov announced the 
formation of a "conciliation commission," to be made up of representatives from 
Tajikistan's Supreme Assembly (the parliament), the government, and the 
National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), in order to resolve the issue of the 
new law prohibiting all religious political parties. (Khovar, 1250 GMT, 2 Jun 98; 
FBIS-SOV-98-153) This law was passed by the Tajik Supreme Assembly at the 
end of May (see previous Digest), in direct opposition to the terms of the peace 
agreement. Both Said Abdullo Nuri and Haji Ali Akbar Turajonzoda (deputy 
leader of the UTO and first deputy premier in the Tajik government) have 
denounced this law and called for President Rahmonov to veto it. 
 
President Rahmonov has expressed neither support for, nor opposition to, the 
law, but seems to be withholding his comments until the conciliation commission 
submits its proposals on how to handle the situation. The commission has been 
granted 20 days (from 2 June) in which to reach a consensus on how the Tajik 
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government should respond to the law. (Khovar, 1250 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-153) 
 
International community reacts to law on political parties 
Representatives of various international organizations and non-Central Asian 
governments have now expressed their opposition to Tajikistan's new law on 
political parties on the grounds that it impedes the peace process in Tajikistan. 
Michel Camdessus, the managing director of the IMF, met with UTO Chairman 
Nuri on 30 May in Dushanbe and declared that the release of IMF funds to the 
Tajik government was contingent upon the achievement of further progress in the 
peace process. Camdessus told Nuri that the IMF considers the establishment of 
economic stability in Tajikistan to be linked directly to the fulfillment of the terms 
of the peace agreement. (ITAR-TASS, 1039 GMT, 30 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
150) 
 
On 27 May, US State Department spokesman James Rubin called upon 
President Rahmonov to invalidate the law, which in the eyes of the US 
government directly violates the terms of the inter-Tajik peace agreement. He 
also implied that the release of further international aid funds to the Tajik 
government will be delayed until President Rahmonov complies with the terms of 
the peace agreement. (RFE/RL Newsline, 28 May 98) On 9 June, UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan finally weighed in with his reaction to the Tajik parliament's 
ban on religious political parties, during a meeting with President Rahmonov in 
New York City. Annan stated that the ban contravenes the "spirit" of the Tajik 
peace accord, and told President Rahmonov that he hoped that the law would be 
overturned. The following day, the UN's acting special envoy to Tajikistan, Paolo 
Lembo, informed the NRC in Dushanbe that the $515 million credit pledged to 
the government of Tajikistan at the Paris Donors conference in May would be 
forthcoming only if there were further progress in the Tajik peace process. 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 11 Jun 98) 
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Spokesmen for the Iranian government and for the Russian Federation's foreign 
ministry also condemned the new law prohibiting the formation of religious 
political parties, stating that it violates the inter-Tajik peace agreement. (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 3 Jun 98) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
More calls for 'united' Azerbaijan 
The United Azerbaijan Movement has called on Azeris living in Iran not to 
participate in Iranian politics, but to struggle to achieve independence. (Turan, 30 
May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-152) A new journal, United Azerbaijan, appeared in May 
of this year. The publication aims at igniting a debate about the idea of unifying 
the Republic of Azerbaijan with the southern, Iranian portion of Azerbaijan. 
(Turan, 0430 GMT, 18 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-141) This follows increased pro-
union agitation on the part of certain Azeri factions, including the party of former 
president Abulfaz Elchibey. In one recent incident the Azeri ambassador was 
dismissed from Teheran after he called for greater autonomy for the Azeri 
population of Iran. (See previous Digests.) 
 
Azeris rally against French decision 
The lower house of the French legislature has followed the Belgians in adopting 
an Armenian genocide resolution. The new Armenian government has adopted 
the goal of attaining widespread international recognition that the WWI 
massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman empire constituted genocide. (See 
previous Digest.) During a conversation with a visiting French delegation, 
Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliev called the decision unjust in view of 
contemporary realities--the occupation of Azeri land and the slaughter of Azeri 
civilians in Khojali in 1992. He also said that this position of the French 
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parliament causes particular dismay in conjunction with France's co-
chairmanship of the Minsk group. (Interfax, 1753 GMT, 3 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
154)  
 
Youth groups together with opposition political parties had a similar assessment. 
They picketed the French embassy in Baku demanding that Azerbaijan cut off all 
relations with France and replace its representation in the Minsk group. When 
they were dispersed by the police, they relocated to a support rally in front of the 
Turkish embassy but were removed from there as well. As a result several 
participants, including one journalist, were arrested and beaten by the police. 
(Turan, 1530 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-154, and Turan, 1120 GMT, 3 Jun 
98; FBIS-SOV-98-155) 
 
Azerbaijani PM meets US officials 
While on a visit to Washington DC in May, Artur Rasizade, the prime minister of 
Azerbaijan, met with Vice President Al Gore, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott, and Senator Mitch McConnell. Talbott in particular stressed that the US 
expects Azerbaijan to hold free and fair presidential elections in the fall. In his 
meeting with McConnell and other senators and representatives, Rasizade again 
called on Congress to lift Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which 
continues to inhibit assistance to Azerbaijan (Turan, 22 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
142) and impairs Azerbaijan's ability to participate in Partnership for Peace 
exercises. Whereas the militaries of other PfP states are eligible to receive 
sponsorship from the US to enable them to participate in exercises, Azerbaijan 
has to finance its participation completely. Due to funding difficulties, Azerbaijan 
has been able to send only one officer to the most recent exercises. (Zerkalo, 16 
May 98, p. 10; FBIS-SOV-98-141) 
 
US, Azerbaijan agree on Ceyhan line, disagree over Baku-Supsa line 
This year's decline in oil prices has led many to doubt the efficiency of building 
the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline since the project could cost as much as $2 billion. 
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Still, US and Azeri experts have repeatedly made public their preference for that 
route and continue to promote it. The president of State Oil Company of 
Azerbaijan (SOCAR), Natig Aliev (son of the president) said that "We never 
considered the Baku-Ceyhan route to be a dead project. On the contrary, we 
believe that the Baku-Ceyhan route is a realistic project for bringing the 
Azerbaijani oil to the Mediterranean Sea." (Turan, 0930 GMT, 25 May 98; FBIS-
SOV-98-145) A few days later the US Undersecretary of Trade, David Aaron, told 
a Baku audience that the administration favors a route which would carry oil 
across the Caspian from Central Asia, and through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey to western markets. He emphasized that the US will not finance any 
project which involves Iran. (ITAR-TASS, 1250 GMT, 2 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
153) 
 
At the same time there is a serious disagreement between the Azeri and US 
partners about the construction of the Baku-Supsa line. This route should be 
completed before the end of 1998. The Baku-Supsa line was estimated to cost 
$315 million but the actual cost is more likely to reach $590 million. Azerbaijan is 
distressed about the cost since it will be paid out of already depressed oil 
revenues. Azerbaijan proposes doubling the size of the pipe so that it can carry 
larger volumes and be incorporated into the Baku-Ceyhan project. US oil 
companies oppose using larger pipes and prefer to stick to the original plans 
because they would like to see the project completed in a timely manner. They 
believe the Baku-Supsa line can be profitable on its own, without linkages to the 
Ceyhan project. The disagreement prompted US Senator Chuck Hagel to lobby 
President Heydar Aliev to intervene personally with SOCAR. (Interfax, 1629 
GMT, 29 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-149) 
 
A pipeline through Ukraine? 
Ukraine announced on 9 June that it plans to become a major competitor, along 
with Russia and Turkey, for the route of the main oil export pipeline from the 
Caspian Sea. The proposed Baku-Supsa-Odessa-Brody route would presumably 
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link up with the trans-Caspian pipeline and would require the construction of a 
Black Sea pipeline. Ukraine has most of the necessary infrastructure, including 
35 percent of the pipeline, already in place, as well as underutilized oil refineries 
and ship-building facilities. (Interfax, 1725 GMT, 25 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-145) 
In addition, this route would free Ukraine and the Baltic states from dependence 
on Russian oil. Its advocates urge the construction of the Ukraine line in addition 
to the Baku-Ceyhan line. (See Prism, 12 Jun 98.) Politically that is the ideal 
solution: It allows all the regional powers friendly to the West to benefit from the 
oil boom and liberates all of them from Russian domination. 
 
However, finding funding for both projects will be tricky at best. At present there 
are major doubts about the Ceyhan project due to its high cost. Moreover, Kyiv is 
not likely to offset importing costs through collecting transit fees. Transit fees are 
simply not that high. Chechnya presently collects $4 per ton of oil that passes 
through the pipeline on its territory. This means that, since the oil pipeline began 
operating in November 1997, Chechnya has earned $1 million in transit fees. 
(ITAR-TASS, 0921 GMT, 26 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-146) Of course, there would 
be more oil going through the major pipeline; still, it is hard to imagine that transit 
fees could offset hundreds of millions of dollars in pipeline cost. Moreover, the 
Ukraine route would require the wider pipe in the Baku-Supsa line which lies at 
the heart of the controversy discussed above. It is by far more likely that the 
Ukraine route will compete against the Ceyhan route when the question is 
decided this fall. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Spring has come to the Baltic region, and military exercises are in bloom. Many 
members of the Baltic states' armed forces have been taking advantage of a 
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plethora of training exercises, under the auspices of NATO's Partnership for 
Peace program as well as through regional agreements. 
 
Baltic military officers took part as observers in a week-long air combat training 
exercise, Cooperative Zenith '98, staged in the United States in the framework of 
NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Observers were sent from all three 
Baltic states, as well as from Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Georgia, Romania, Slovakia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. NATO members Great Britain, Canada, the 
Netherlands, and Italy participated in the exercise with the US. (Baltic News 
Service Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 14 May 98) 
 
Shortly thereafter, members of Lithuania's armed forces joined another PfP 
exercise, this time in Denmark. The joint land, air and sea exercises, called 
"Cooperative Jaguar," included over 3,000 servicemen from 17 NATO member 
states and partnership countries. (ELTA, 1024 GMT, 18 May 98; FBIS-UMA-98-
138) 
 
In June, an infantry platoon of the Estonian defense forces arrived in the United 
States for international peace enforcement training, Cooperative Osprey '98, 
scheduled to be held through 19 June at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. This 
training exercise, staged under the auspices of NATO and its Partnership for 
Peace program, is aimed at improving the interoperability of the armed forces of 
NATO partner nations with alliance forces for peacekeeping and humanitarian 
aid missions. Besides NATO members Canada and the United States, 
Partnership for Peace nations Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan were scheduled to participate. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 
1000 GMT, 1 Jun 98) 
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The Baltic countries are not looking solely on the western horizon for military 
alliances. Both Lithuania's Seimas and Estonia's Riigikogu ratified the agreement 
on the establishment of the joint Baltic peacekeeping battalion, BALTBAT, last 
month. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 21 May 98, and 1000 
GMT, 2 Jun 98). Latvia's parliament, the Saeima, had ratified the agreement in 
April. The document, designed to address issues of leadership, personnel status 
and disciplinary problems that were not regulated by the initial 1994 agreement, 
had been signed by the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian defense ministers in 
Tallinn on 10 December 1997. 
 
From 4 to 11 June, Baltic troops were involved in the Smooth Road war games at 
Lithuania's military base in Pabrade. The war games involved 500 troops from 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, under the command of BALTBAT chief Lieutenant 
Colonel Alar Laneman. Next month, 4,500 troops from abroad are expected to 
land in Lithuania with weaponry, combat technology and munitions to participate 
in the international Baltic Challenge '98 exercises, scheduled to be held in the 
Klaipeda District. Baltic Challenge '98 will involve troops from Lithuania, Estonia, 
Finland, Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Latvia, Denmark, Germany, Holland, Poland 
and the US, along with BALTBAT. The largest number of troops participating in 
the exercises will come from the US (2,149), Lithuania (800) and BALTBAT 
(660). (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 4 Jun 98) 
 
Lithuanian military personnel also participated in the first staff exercises of the 
"Pollithbat," or the Polish-Lithuanian Battalion of Peacekeeping Forces, held in 
May at the home base of 4 Suwalki Armored Cavalry Brigade. The exercises 
were designed to prepare the command cadre for planning and directing the 
unit's operations as part of UN peacekeeping forces. According to Maj. Zbigniew 
Skora, the commanding officer of the battalion, exercises in redeploying the 
battalion and operating in a region of conflict were conducted, along with training 
in the preparation of staff documents according to NATO standards. The unit 
consists of personnel from Poland's 4 Armored Cavalry Brigade (based in 
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Orzysz), and from Lithuania's "Iron Wolf" Motorized Infantry Brigade (from 
Alytus). Altogether 750 to 800 persons are to serve in this battalion. The staff, the 
headquarters company, and the supply company all are to be joint structures. It 
is predicted that the unit is to be ready for operation as of 2 January 1999. 
(Polska Zbrojna, 22 May 98; FBIS-EEU-98-153) 
 
LITHUANIA 
Many in military still suffer from training, health deficiencies 
The PfP and regional training, while useful in terms of Baltic hopes for joining 
NATO, has not been enough to deal with some very real deficiencies that the 
Lithuanian military currently is experiencing. According to armed forces 
commander Lieutenant General Jonas Andriskevicius, Lithuanian troops are 
insufficiently prepared to combat armored vehicles and aviation or fight a foe at 
great distance. However, Andriskevicius told members of parliament that this 
year's military budget allows for providing troops with the most indispensable 
items and training them to use weaponry, as well as to participate in international 
war games and peacekeeping missions. Anti-tank weaponry has already been 
acquired or is being ordered, along with communications technology and new 
barracks. Answering questions on the physical fitness of draftees, he said that 
their state of health "is becoming almost an object of ridicule, since among 
European countries, Lithuania's youth is the very weakest." As much as one-half 
of youths drafted receive deferments from military service for various health 
problems. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 12 May 98) 
 
Big Brother isn't watching, but the Third Department may have been 
Just who is watching whom, and under whose orders, are questions that have 
been preoccupying many members of the Seimas lately. The popular newspaper 
Lietuvos rytas reported toward the end of May that some high-ranking 
government officials had been under surveillance by the Third Unit of the 
Government Security Department, a unit directly accountable to Seimas 
chairman Vytautas Landsbergis and Minister of the Interior Vidmantas Ziemelis. 
 44 
President Valdus Adamkus immediately requested an investigation by the 
Prosecutor General's Office. Prosecutor General Kazys Pednycia, when asked 
by journalists if he had felt he was under surveillance, replied that he was too 
busy to look around. (ELTA, 1254 GMT, 25 May 98; FBIS-SOV-98-145) He was 
destined to become busier. 
 
Landsbergis and his Conservative Party quickly issued denials, although 
apparently without consulting each other. Landsbergis denies instructing anyone 
to carry out surveillance operations, although he admitted that he had asked 
secret services to "check certain individuals," reportedly those who had issued 
threats against him. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1600 GMT, 26 May 98). 
Meanwhile a spokesman for the party (and first deputy chairman of the Seimas), 
Andrius Kubilius, did not dispute that government officials had been under 
surveillance, but did deny categorically that such observation was ordered by 
Landsbergis. The culprits, according to Kubilius, most likely were former KGB 
staff members working in the government. (Baltic News Service Daily Report, 
1300 GMT, 25 May 98) [Shortly thereafter, the Conservative Party submitted 
draft legislation that would ban from government employment those former KGB 
agents who had been actively involved in repressive acts. The bills bars ex-KGB 
agents from positions as civil servants as well as from posts in government, self-
government, defense, and legal institutions, state control, strategic economic 
entities, banks and security structures. (ELTA, 1604, 4 Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-
155)] 
 
In a statement probably not designed to instill confidence in government 
agencies, the chief of the Third Unit, Zigmas Slusnys, announced that such 
surveillance, even if it had been ordered, could not possibly have been carried 
out, since the unit had no appropriate equipment. (Baltic News Service Daily 
Report, 1600 GMT, 25 May 98). Whether this was an ill-advised attempt to 
increase the unit's budget, or an effort to convince the public that his unit was 
self-contained and ineffective, future disclosures would demonstrate that the unit 
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could and did expand beyond its official function of protecting high-level 
government officials. 
 
While the investigation was continuing, Ziemelis' replacement as Minister of the 
Interior, Stasys Sedbaras, signed on 2 June an order to dissolve the Third Unit. 
According to Lietuvos rytas, prior to his resignation (submitted before the scandal 
broke, and citing friction with PM Gediminas Vagnorius), Ziemelis had been 
planning "a total surveillance" to get information "on every resident in Lithuania." 
The paper reported that Vilnius police authorities had been instructed by the 
police department to collect information on every resident of the capital city. A 
municipal police head said he believed the "absurd" total surveillance plan to be 
dropped after Sedbaras had taken over as interior minister. (ELTA, 1519 GMT, 3 
Jun 98; FBIS-SOV-98-154) 
 
The following day, additional allegations were reported, again by Lietuvos rytas. 
The newspaper stated on 4 June that members of the Prosecutor General's 
Office and the Third Unit of the Government VIP Security Department carried out 
illicit surveillance operations against candidates Arturas Paulauskas and Valdas 
Adamkus during the presidential campaign last year. According to the daily, 
documents confirming that Paulauskas was under surveillance were found in the 
office of Kestutis Ragaisis of the Prosecutor General's Organized Crime and 
Corruption Investigations Department. Written reports on Paulauskas' 
electioneering routes, meetings, activists of his headquarters and sponsors were 
found in Ragaisis' office. Surveillance operations were also carried out by the 
undercover Third Unit of the Government VIP Security Department with help from 
the Prosecutor General's Office and the State Security Department, according to 
the daily. The newspaper reported that the head of the undercover unit, Slusnys, 
and Prosecutor Ragaisis would privately ask police and state security department 
officials in various towns to supply information discrediting the Paulauskas and 
Adamkus camps. The newspaper does not say if such information was provided. 
(Baltic News Service Daily Report, 1300 GMT, 4 Jun 98) 
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